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ABSTRACT
The paper aims to examine the internal motivation of taxpayer’s behavior, and the 
factors affecting tax morale and voluntary tax compliance The authors provide  
scientific results of the tax experiments in post-Soviet countries (Russia and Belarus). 
The laboratory tax experiment was carried out in a form of a business game engag-
ing students of various levels of education and background. The controllabi-lity of 
the experiment with the impossibility of material encouragement is ensured in the 
student’s environment in the form of scores to the final attestation. In order to obtain 
data on tax behavior motivation, a survey on attitude to tax system wаs conducted. 
Respondents (experiment participants) were asked to indicate their level of agree-
ment with defined statements by Likert scale. To assess the differences between 
two groups of participants (who paid and who do not paid tax), the data obtained 
as a result of filling out the questionnaire using the Mann-Whitney U-test and the 
Kruskal-Wallis H-test were  analyzed. The study results affirmed the hypothesis 
generated earlier, the personal tax morale influences the national tax system and 
the tax behavior of an individual. The article proves that the awareness of the ways 
government spends public revenue and the trust level to the state and tax system 
itself influence tax  behavior directly. The civil awareness on the real state of fiscal 
distribution increases the trust level to the government among taxpayers and is the 
essential motivation to pay taxes. The developed methodology may be used in an 
educational process to increase tax literacy, its further application in the scientific 
research will allow us to derive evidence-based methods and ways to directly influ-
ence tax behavior, which may enlarge the public revenue in the times of an unstable 
global economy. 
KEYWORDS 
tax behavior; attitude to taxes; tax compliance; tax evasion; tax experiment; behavioral 
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HIGHLIGHTS
1. The study reveals that the tax audit affects more the amount of evading taxes 
than the number of evaders, where an increase of education level helps to reduce 
tax evasion through citizens, to make an individual more competent and more 
responsible as a taxpayer
2. Laboratory tax behavior monitoring of students allows us to identify the factors that 
influence on the real national tax behavior and tax experiments could become a tool 
for the formation of strategies of interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers in 
Russia and Belarus
3. The main incentives for paying taxes are the trust towards the government and the 
tax system and the understanding of the society-oriented character of the state
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Целью статьи является исследование внутренней мотивации поведения нало-
гоплательщиков и изучение факторов, влияющих на налоговую дисциплину 
и ответственное соблюдение налогового законодательства. Представлены на-
учные результаты проведенных авторами лабораторных налоговых экспери-
ментов в постсоветских странах (Россия и Беларусь).  Эксперимент проводился 
в форме деловой игры среди студентов различных уровней обучения. Для обе-
спечения контролируемости эксперимента студенты получали условный доход 
в виде баллов к промежуточной аттестации. Для получения данных о мотивах 
налогового поведения был проведен опрос об отношении к налоговой систе-
ме. Респондентам (участникам эксперимента) было предложено указать свой 
уровень согласия с определенными утверждениями по шкале Ликерта. Чтобы 
оценить различия между двумя группами участников (заплативших и не запла-
тивших налог), проанализированы данные, полученные в результате заполне-
ния анкеты с использованием U-критерия Манна-Уитни и H-критерия Краске-
ла-Уоллиса. Результаты исследования подтвердили предположение о влиянии 
отношения к налогам на налоговое поведение. Исследование доказывает, что 
доверие к правительству и налоговой системе, осознание социальной направ-
ленности деятельности государства, является основным мотивом для уплаты 
налогов. Разработанная методика и инструментарий налогового эксперимента 
могут быть использованы в учебном процессе для повышения налоговой гра-
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Introduction 
The world today is actively switch-
ing to electronic interaction in different 
spheres of life, and taxation is no excep-
tion. Electronic services facilitating in-
teractions between taxpayers and tax 
authorities are being introduced at an 
impressive speed. All this may produce 
a false impression that such technological 
innovations could solve most problems of 
the taxation system, including the prob-
lem of tax evasion. We should, however, 
keep it in mind that interactions in the 
digital environment remain interactions 
between people who have their own in-
terests and preferences. J. Schumpeter’s 
claim that “psychology is really the basis 
from which any social sciences must start 
and in terms of witch all fundamental ex-
planation must run” [1] remains relevant 
in any economy, including a digital one. 
Without taking into account the motiva-
tion behind the taxpayers’ behavior it is 
hard to understand why people still pay 
taxes to the budget with very low detec-
tion probabilities for tax evasion, and how 
to increase the collection of taxes in the fu-
ture without increasing the administrative 
pressure. 
The behavioral aspects of tax-related 
behavior have been described in research 
publications since 1970s. Due to this, most 
studies of tax behavior and its depen-
dence on subjective factors refer to coun-
tries where the observance of tax legisla-
tion and tax discipline have traditionally 
been high. The experience of foreign peers 
in the sphere of tax behavior is actively 
studied in Russia. For example, a spe-
cialist in management psychology Erich 
Kirchler presented a report “Economic 
Psychology of Tax Behaviour: Litera-
ture Overview and The “Slippery Slope” 
Framework” at the workshop “Rationa-
lity. Behavior. Experiments” in the Higher 
School of Economics1. However, tax ex-
periments per se have not yet been intro-
duced in the practice of research. 
The relevance of the scientific prob-
lem caused by the necessity of the com-
plex study of factors that lead law-abiding 
behavior of taxpayers in the post-Soviet 
countries. Despite the relevance of an 
integrated approach to the study of tax 
evasion neither methods of behavioral 
economics, nor the psychological and so-
ciological approaches to the study of the 
behavior of taxpayers practically do not 
apply in Russia and Belarus.
The goal of our research is to bridge 
the gaps in the experimental research of 
tax behavior and its motivation in the 
1 Available at: https://iq.hse.ru/news/ 
177673493.html
мотности, а дальнейшее их применение в научных исследованиях позволит 
предложить научно обоснованные методы и формы воздействия на поведение 
налогоплательщиков, гарантирующие увеличение налоговых поступлений 
в бюджет в условиях нестабильности мировой экономической системы.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налоговое поведение; отношение к налогам; налоговая дисциплина; уклонение 
от налогов; налоговые эксперименты; поведенческая экономика
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. В результате исследования выявлено, что вероятность проверки в большей 
степени влияет на объем скрываемых налогов, чем на количество нарушителей, 
а повышение образовательного уровня позволяет сформировать не только бо-
лее грамотного, но и более ответственного налогоплательщика
2. Исследование показало, что наблюдение за налоговым поведением студентов 
в лаборатории позволяет определить факторы, влияющие на поведение реаль-
ных налогоплательщиков, поэтому налоговые эксперименты могут стать полез-
ным инструментом в разработке стратегии взаимодействия налогоплательщи-
ков и налоговых органов в России и Беларуси
3. Исследование доказывает, что доверие к правительству и налоговой системе, 
осознание социальной направленности деятельности государства, является ос-
новным мотивом для уплаты налогов
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Russian Federation and Republic of Be-
larus. We suggest using a laboratory tax 
experiment developed within the frame-
work of behavioral economy to study 
taxpayers’ behavior. The focus group of 
the study is students who will soon ac-
quire the rights and corresponding duties 
of taxpayers. 
The first part of the article contains 
an overview of research publications that 
form the theoretical background of the 
research; the second part describes meth-
odology and instruments. The third part 
presents data on tax experiments in Rus-
sian and Belarus universities. The fourth 
part contains the results of a survey on 
the attitude of students from different 
countries to the system of taxation. The 
final part presents discussion and conclu-
sions. 
1. Theory
The models of the neoclassical ap-
proach to studying tax behavior are based 
on the premise that the taxpayer makes 
rational choices, and aims at maximizing 
benefit when making the decision to evade 
taxes. The founders of this approach Mi-
chael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo [2] 
used the criminal choice model by Gary 
Becker [3] to develop a so-called “A-S 
model” that demonstrates two behavioral 
strategies — risky tax avoidance and safe 
payment of taxes. This model was ex-
tensively used in numerous neoclassical 
models [4; 5], which supplemented it with 
various factors and assumptions. 
Within the framework of neo-institu-
tional analysis, the interpretation of ratio-
nality is extended by singling out three of 
its forms: maximization, limited rationa-
lity and organic rationality of economic 
agents. These are supplemented by the 
principle of self-interest, which can be en-
forced through opportunistic tax behav-
ior; besides, the authors study the impact 
of de-formalization of tax rules (when the 
rules set by the state are substituted by in-
formal rules, which in practice takes the 
form of tax avoidance) [6, p. 70; 7].
The transition from the neoclassical to 
the neo-institutional approach to behav-
ioral economy based on the paradigm of 
free, rational and unlimited choice of the 
taxpayer was connected with the necessity 
to explain why the observance of tax legis-
lation is much higher than the level which 
the enforcement measures (audits and 
fines) could ensure. Thus, many neoclassi-
cal economic models show a considerably 
high degree of tax discipline observance 
and insignificant tax avoidance by tax-
payers. In this connection, the advocates 
of behavioral approach point out that the 
widespread image of total tax avoidance 
is just a myth. For example, Alm, McClel-
land & Schulze [8], Fild & Frey [9]. Elf-
fers [10], Long & Swingen [11] claim, that 
some taxpayers never evade taxes and 
never try to find ways of doing so. Frey & 
Foppa [12], Pyle [13] criticize the opinion 
that individuals are amoral in their desire 
to maximize income by cutting taxes. In 
this connection, in modern behavioral re-
search the question “why people do not 
pay taxes?” is substituted with the ques-
tion “why people pay taxes?”. 
Behavioral economy uses the con-
cepts of tax moral, tax ethics, tax avoid-
ance mentality, attitudes towards taxes. 
Tax moral (inner motivation to pay taxes) 
is described as inner honesty inherent in 
people, their moral duty to observe laws 
and pay taxes. Although early studies 
of tax moral were conducted as far back 
as 1960s (Cologne school of tax psychol-
ogy — Schmolders [14], Strümpel [15]), 
the very concept of tax moral was for a 
long time denied by most researchers. 
Later, tax moral was mentioned in some 
studies of tax behavior (Lewis [16], Vogel 
[17]), but studies totally devoted to this is-
sue appeared only in the early 21st century 
(Fild & Frey [9]). Empirical data obtained 
in such research demonstrate considerable 
differences in tax moral between countries 
and the influence of socio-cultural and 
psychological factors on the behavior of 
taxpayers (Alm & Torgler [18; 19]). 
In the Russian Federation and in the 
post-Soviet countries, the issues of tax mo-
rality and tax ethics are considered from a 
theoretical perspective yet. So the paper by 
Zotova and Boguslavsky [20] examines the 
concepts of «tax honesty» and «tax ethics», 
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which is interpreted by the authors as «the 
norms of behavior that guide citizens in 
their relationships with the government.» 
The paper substantiates the importance 
of social activity of citizens to establish a 
trusting relationship between the govern-
ment and society. It also discusses the so-
cio-psychological background of dishonest 
taxpayers. Some authors analyze opportu-
nistic tax behavior leading to tax evasion, 
for example (Merkulova [21], Vishnevsky 
[7], Mayburov [22], Fedotov [23]). Howev-
er, in these works, attention is often drawn 
to the economic causes of tax behavior.
Experimental methods are one of the 
instruments of experimental psychology. 
They make it possible to obtain informa-
tion regarding various phenomena, in-
cluding hidden ones, such as, for example, 
tax evasion. As pointed out by Nobel lau-
reate Vernon Smith, the value of experi-
mental research is that they «…directed 
at closing two gaps: the gap between de-
cision theory and decision behavior, and 
the gap between evidence concerning how 
people think about economic questions 
and evidence concerning how people be-
have in experimental markets» [24]. 
A detailed description of experimen-
tal tests of various factors influencing the 
decision to evade taxes is presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1
Laboratory tax experiments’ results  
in foreign countries 
Studied factor Experiment’s  
conclusions
Audit probability Positive impact on the ob-
servance of tax legislation 
Penalty rate Weak impact on the ob-
servance of tax legislation 
Tax rates Positive impact on the ob-
servance of tax legislation
Taxpayer’s 
income
Weak impact on the ob-
servance of tax legislation
Reimbursement of 
some of the taxes 
paid as a transfer 
to the taxpayer 
A growth in transfers has 
a positive influence on the 
observance of legislation 
Impact of perso- 
nal moral qualities
An effective constraint for 
tax evasion
Openness and 
honesty of tax 
authorities 
Positive impact on the 
observance of legislation
Source: based on [25]. 
Lab economic experiments are carried 
out in an artificial environment — a so-
called “laboratory”, and the subjects 
know that they take part in an experiment. 
Starting with the first lab tax experiment 
conducted by Israeli researchers 
(Freidland, Maital, and Rutenberg) in 
1970s [26], students are the most common 
environment for laboratory experiments. 
We developed the methodology of 
studying tax behavior using the experience 
of tax experiments from different countries 
that were based on “experiments with the 
public good”. During the experiment with 
the public good individuals face a choice — 
to invest in public or in private good (Alm 
[27]). It should be mentioned that up to 
now there have practically been no tax 
experiments in the Russian Federation. 
Some publications (including those by 
the authors) contain descriptions of 
experimental methods [28–31]. At the same 
time, tax experiments have been conducted 
in other countries for over 40 years. 
2. Research methodology and 
instruments
2.1. Methodology  
of a laboratory tax experiment
The drawback of laboratory experi-
ments is that the actual behavior of tax-
payers cannot be reproduced in the artifi-
cial environment, just like real life cannot 
be reproduced. Field experiments based 
on using real subjects (who do not know 
that they are part of an experiment) are, 
undoubtedly, more persuasive and valu-
able, but they cannot be carried out with-
out the tax authorities, while the proce-
dure itself is complicated and very costly. 
The choice of students as the experi-
ment environment is determined by one 
more factor. According to State Statistics 
Committee, the average age of working 
people is at present about 41 years old2, 
including 64.5% aged 35 and older3. The 
2 Russia in Figures. Moscow, 2017. P. 97. 
Available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
doc_2017/rusfig/rus17.pdf
3 Available at: http://www.gks.ru/wps/
wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/
publications/catalog/doc_1140097038766. 
Calculated from data in Table 2.2.
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average age of executives in Russian top-
500 companies is even older — 50 years4. 
These people were born, studied, and 
many of them started working before 
1990. So, the formation of most modern 
taxpayers happened in the conditions of 
dominant administrative-command sys-
tem and social ideology, and although it 
instilled in people a sense of responsibil-
ity before the state, this responsibility was 
“mainly oriented towards the external as-
sessment” [32, p. 44]. This generation of 
taxpayers is gradually becoming the past. 
Behavioral reaction of the students, whose 
views are ahead of the actual picture of 
today’s reactions, could, in our opinion, 
reflect the mood of the generation of the 
future taxpayers in the 21st century. 
Just like other researchers using ex-
perimental methods, we based our work 
in the methodology of a so-called “stan-
dard tax experiment”. Its procedure can 
be described in the following way: partici-
pants receive or earn a certain income and 
should declare it. According to the experi-
ment’s conditions, the declaration cannot 
be checked automatically. The participants 
pay taxes from the declared income. The 
experiment includes a certain possibility of 
an audit. If undeclared income is revealed, 
the tax and the fine need to be paid. 
The experiment was carried out as a 
business game during classes. In this game, 
the students were asked to use finan-
cial data to fill in the tax form. The game 
consisted of several rounds (tax periods), 
the students did not know the number 
of rounds beforehand. At the beginning 
of each round the organizer of the game 
(the professor) announced the rules of the 
game, the information regarding the pos-
sibility of an audit and the amount of fine, 
which were written down on the board. 
After the participants filled in the forms, a 
randomly chosen part of declaration forms 
was checked, the results of the audit were 
announced, and the declarations were re-
turned to the participants. The participants 
then calculated the size of the remaining in-
come. After that, they were asked to fill in 
new forms for the new tax period. 
4 Available at:  https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/
business/02/10/2015/560e41579a794751360896bf
Variable parameters of the game cor-
responded to the practice of standard tax 
experiments: size of income; tax rate; au-
dit probability; penalty rate. 
The key problem of laboratory experi-
ments is that, unlike real-life situations, 
negative behavior does not result in any 
real financial gains or losses for the par-
ticipants. This is the challenge of creating 
a controlled situation — the participants 
should be interested not only in the game 
itself, but also in its results. One of the 
main methods of maintaining control in 
lab experiments, suggested by W. Smith, is 
the opportunity for the participants to get 
rewards. According to W. Smith’s theory 
of “induced valuation” [33], the reward 
should be closely connected with the re-
sults of the participants’ actions, should be 
meaningful and compensate any inconve-
niences and costs of the participants, and 
should also be confidential (not known to 
other participants). 
Understandably, we were not in a po-
sition to offer monetary compensation to 
students, so we made a decision to moti-
vate them by giving them a chance to earn 
extra points toward their credit grades in 
our subject. Thus, the instruction for the 
participants looked like this: “Your in-
come is 10 points. It is taxable income and 
you should declare it. Tax rate is 20%. You 
can pay a full tax or its part, the possibility 
of an audit is 30% (30% of randomly cho-
sen declarations will be checked). If the 
audit determines that somebody did not 
pay their tax in full, the offender will have 
to pay the tax and also a fine for tax avoid-
ance, which is 40% of the unpaid sum”. 
2.2. Research tools
We used a hypothetical “tax return” 
(Table 2) to conduct our experiment.
Table 2 
Hypothetical “tax return” form
1. Name, Surname
2. Tax period 1
3. Taxable Income 10 points
4. Tax rate, % 20%
5. Tax owed 2 points
6. Tax payed
7.
8.
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The “tax return” form shows the tax 
rate, income, and tax owed (income mul-
tiplied by the tax rate). Subjects used the 
form to enter a tax reporting decision, with 
the chosen amount of income (and associ-
ated tax payment) shown in the line 6. Line 
6 is filled by the game participant. After all 
subjects fill the form, the audit outcome 
randomly determines independently for 
each individual according to the pre-an-
nounced audit probability. The last two 
lines are intended to fill in the results of the 
audit of the declaration. Line 7 indicates the 
amount of the penalties if the declaration 
has been selected for audit and tax is unde-
clared. The resulting earnings (if audited or 
if not audited) which is equal to the player’s 
income minus the additional amount of tax 
and fine, plus refund is indicated in line 8.
2.3. Experimental design 
Each subject chose how much in-
come to report in 5 rounds. Income was 
held constant (10 points, except the last 
round), as was the tax rate (20 or 30 per-
cent). The probability of an audit was ei-
ther 20 percent or 30 percent. The fine on 
unreported income (the individual paid 
unpaid taxes plus an additional penalty) 
was either 40 percent or 50 percent. Thus 
there were five different treatment com-
binations based on the audit probability 
and penalty. In addition to their earnings 
from the fifth round, subjects received tax 
refund. Experimental conditions are pre-
sented in Table 3. The color indicates the 
variable that is changed in the round of 
the game. 
Table 3 
Experimental conditions 
Parameters of treatment 
combinations for each 
round
Game round
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Income 10 10 10 10 5
Tax rate, % 20 30 30 30 30
Audit probability, % 30 30 20 20 20
Penalty rate on 
unreported tax, %
40 40 40 50 50
The experiment was conducted at 
Baikal State University (Russia) and at 
Belarus State Economic University using 
student subjects from both institutions 
(students). There were 208 students from 
Baikal State University (Russia) and the 
172 students from Belarus State Econo-
mic University. All participants have eco-
nomic knowledge and easily understood 
the description of the experiment. The 
age differences of the participants were 
insignificant, so we did not investigate 
this factor. 
2.4. The attitude to the tax system 
questionnaire
At the second stage of the experiment 
the subjects also filled out the question-
naire about the attitude to the tax sys-
tem. In this case, we followed the logic of 
the authors of the following fundamental 
tax experiment (Spicer & Becker), who 
introduced into the methodology of ex-
periments a tool called the «tax resistance 
scale» [34]. 
Data for second part of our research 
was collected using questionnaires ap-
plied to primary sources. The question-
naire consists of twenty (20) statements 
was designed to evaluate taxpayers at-
titudes against taxes5. A five-point Likert 
scale (from1 strong agreement to 5 strong 
disagreements) was used to indicate 
agreement or disagreement of the subject 
with each statement (Table 4). 
Respondents were asked to choose 
a number to indicate the extent of their 
agreement or disagreement with each 
statement: 5 points — fully agree, 
4 points — agree, 3 points — difficult 
to answer, 2 points — do not agree, 
1 point — completely disagree.
The questionnaire form consisted of 
three types of questions. The question-
naire contains 12 questions, the positive 
answer to which characterizes the positive 
attitude of the experiment participants to 
the tax system (1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 
17, 19, 20); 5 questions, a positive answer 
to which implies a negative assessment 
(3, 6, 14, 16, 18); 3 questions of a neutral na-
ture, the answer to which does not imply 
value judgments (2, 9, 12). The last group 
of questions is presented in the question-
5 We are gratitude for prof. Aleksandr Vyatkin 
whose questionnaire we used.
Journal of Tax Reform, 2018, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 266–290
273
ISSN 2412-8872
naire in order to relieve the emotional 
tension of the participants. This group of 
questions was not included in the analysis 
of the results.
3. Experimental Results
3.1. Experimental Results in Russia 
The students from Baikal State Uni-
versity (Russia) were trained on different 
level of education: bachelors; master stu-
dents and postgraduate students. 
In Figure 1 we present the level of 
noncompliance for each group of students 
(bachelors, undergraduates and postgrad-
uate students) and for different treatment 
combination based on the tax rate, audit 
probability and penalty rate. The noncom-
pliance rate for each group is calculated as 
declared tax divided by (true) tax. 
Table 4 
Questionnaire on attitude towards tax system
№ Statements Answer
1 The tax system in our country allows redistributing income effectively
2 Due to taxes, health care systems, education, etc. are developing
3 The tax system in our country is ineffective 
4 Most citizens in our country pay taxes on time and in full
5 If everyone pays taxes, the standard of living in our country will increase
6 In our country there will never be fair taxation
7 If to raise taxes, we all will live better
8 The attitude toward taxes in our country can change for the better
9 Taxes are fees for certain public goods provided by the state
10 A good citizen has to pay taxes
11 One of the functions of taxation is social justice
12 Taxes are inevitable
13 I pay taxes on all my income
14 If there is even the slightest opportunity to avoid paying taxes, I will use it
15 I pay taxes because I believe that it is my duty
16 I will pay taxes only in the case of a real threat of restricting travel abroad
17 The tax system in our country is open and transparent
18 I do not trust our tax service
19 Paying taxes, I know exactly what this money goes
20 Filling in the tax payment form not cause difficulty for me
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decreases
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increases
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(postgraduates)
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(undergraduates)
Share of unpaid tax, %
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(postgraduates)
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(undergraduates)
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(bachelors)
Figure 1. The level of noncompliance for different groups of students
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These aggregate data reveal that the 
average compliance rate depended on 
education level of the subjects. The high-
er education level meet higher level of 
tax compliance (lower percentage of tax 
evaders and lower percentage of unpaid 
tax). Thus, subjects who already have uni-
versity education (muster students and 
postgraduate students) demonstrated the 
higher level of tax compliance then sub-
jects without university education (bach-
elor students). 
The experiment also obtained the 
data on the impact on taxpayer’s behav-
ior the economic factors: the amount of 
income, tax rates and possible losses from 
tax evasion (probability of audit and the 
penalty rate). 
The aggregate data of the game reveal 
the following (Figure 2):
– the tax rate increase in the second 
round caused the percentage of unpaid 
tax increase in four groups of six;
– the audit probability decrease in 
the third round caused an increase in the 
percentage of unpaid tax in all groups, 
the proportion of evaders remained un-
changed;
– the penalty rate increase in the 
fourth round resulted in the decrease of 
the share of unpaid tax;
– the tax refund in conjunction with 
the income decrease in the fifth round led 
to different results: in some causes — the 
share of unpaid tax increases, in others – it 
decreases.
These aggregate data reveal that the 
growth the percentage of evaders out-
pace the growth of the share of unpaid 
tax only in two rounds (2 and 5). This 
means, that tax rate increase induces 
high incidence of tax evasion. Tax refund 
(«reward law-abiding behavior») does it 
always lead to the reduction in evasion to 
a baseline: it may be affected by the effect 
of a reduction in income, i.e. the amount 
of risk.
Reducing the audit probability 
slightly affects on the involvement in il-
legal behavior, but evaders are willing 
to risk more substantial amounts. The 
increase in the fine rate predictably re-
duces the scale of evasion, both in the 
amount of unpaid tax and the number 
of evaders.
The aggregate data of the game 
shown in Figure 3.
The results of the questionnaire were 
analyzed by comparing the number of 
positive answers (answer «4» — I agree; 
answer «5» — I fully agree) between the 
experiment participants who paid and did 
not pay tax (Figure 4).
When comparing the answers given 
by the participants who have paid and not 
paid the tax, a number of regularities are 
revealed.
When answering questions illus-
trating a positive assessment of the tax 
system, the greatest range was observed 
when answering the following ques-
tions:
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Figure 2. The share of evaders and the share of unpaid tax  
under different experiment parameters (Russia) 
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Tax refund; income decreases
↓ 41% unpaid tax ↓ 47% evaders 
Penalty increases
↓ 45%unpaid tax ↓ 51% evaders
Audit probability decreases
↑ 54% unpaid tax 62% evaders 
Tax rate increases
↑ 44% unpaid tax ↑ 62% evaders
Initial conditions
34% unpaid tax 42% evaders
Figure 3. The impact of economic incentives  
on the experiment participants behavior (Russia)
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Figure 4. Distribution of positive answers to questions  
about the attitude to tax system among  
the experiment participants who paid and did not pay tax
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1. I pay taxes because I believe that 
it is my duty. Such an answer chose 75% 
of the experiment participants who have 
paid the tax, and 39% whom have not paid 
the tax (range is 36%).
2. The tax system in our country al-
lows redistributing income effectively. 
This answer chose 46% of the experiment 
participants who have paid the tax, and 
24% whom have not paid the tax (range 
is 22%).
3. Paying taxes, I know exactly what 
this money goes. This answer chose 21% 
of the experiment participants who have 
paid the tax, and 8% whom have not paid 
the tax (range is 13%).
4. The tax system in our country is 
open and transparent. This answer chose 
29% of the experiment participants who 
have paid the tax, and 18% whom have 
not paid the tax (range is 11%).
When answering questions that dem-
onstrate a negative assessment by the re-
spondent for the practice of taxation, the 
greatest range was observed when an-
swering the following questions.
1. If there is even the slightest oppor-
tunity to avoid paying taxes, I will use it. 
This answer was given by 45% of the ex-
periment participants who have not paid 
the tax, and 19% whom have paid the tax 
(range is 26%).
2. I will pay taxes only in the case of 
a real threat of restricting travel abroad. 
This answer was given by 24% of the ex-
periment participants who have not paid 
the tax, and 4% whom have paid the tax 
(range is 20%).
Experiment participants were more 
unanimous in assessing the activities of 
tax authorities, regardless of their tax 
behavior (Figure 5). So, more than 60% 
of participants have no difficulty filling 
out a tax return; almost 80% trust our 
tax service and only 25% consider the tax 
system ineffective. The participants are 
unanimous in the negative assessment of 
the prospects for raising taxes: only 5–8% 
believe, that if we raise taxes we will all 
live better.
Regarding the tax behavior of other 
citizens, the experiment participants 
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The tax system in our country allows redistributing income effectively
Due to taxes, health care systems, education, etc. are developing
The tax system in our country is ineffective
Most citizens in our country pay taxes on time and in full
If everyone pays taxes, the standard of living in our country will increase
In our country there will never be fair taxation
If to raise taxes, we all will live better
The attitude toward taxes in our country can change for the better
Taxes are fees for certain public goods provided by the state
A good citizen has to pay taxes
One of the functions of taxation is social justice
Taxes are inevitable
I pay taxes on all my income
If there is even the slightest opportunity to avoid paying taxes, I will use it
I pay taxes because I believe that it is my duty
I will pay taxes only in the case of a real threat of restricting travel abroad
The tax system in our country is open and transparent
I do not trust our tax service
Paying taxes, I know exactly what this money goes
Filling in the tax payment form not cause difficulty for me
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Figure 5. The results of the questionnaire on attitude towards tax system  
(Russia)
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formed a pessimistic point of view. Less 
than 1/3 of respondents agree with the 
statement «Most citizens in our country 
pay taxes on time and in full». At the same 
time, there are no differences (in percent-
age terms) between the groups of respon-
dents who paid and did not pay taxes dur-
ing the experiment.
The perception and attitudes of the 
respondents to taxation were analyzed: 
whether there is significantly difference 
according to their decision during ex-
periment (to pay or do not pay tax). Thus 
our sample (experiment participants 
who filled questionnaire) consists of two 
groups: group 1 — 66 participants who do 
not paid tax, and group 2 — 128 partici-
pants who paid tax at the experiment. I.e. 
grouping variable is compliance.
H0: responders who not paid tax have 
the same distribution of answers on Likert 
scale as responders who paid tax.
The following is descriptive statistics 
for taxpayers and tax evaders. In order 
to reveal central tendencies for question-
naire results among the experiment par-
ticipants who paid and did not pay tax, 
we calculated several measures: mean, 
mode and standard deviation for each 
group. For Likert scale the most appro-
priate measure of central tendency is the 
mode. 
The results of calculation are present-
ed in Table 5 (0 — not paid; 1 — paid).
Minimal standard deviation is 
characteristic of question «A good citizen 
has to pay taxes». The greatest range of 
responders’ estimates is observed when 
answering questions «If there is even the 
slightest opportunity to avoid paying 
taxes, I will use it» and «I will pay taxes 
only in the case of a real threat of restricting 
travel abroad». 
According to this table, quite 
remarkable is the respond to statement 
«A good citizen has to pay taxes» from 
violators. (Kurtosis is 3.46. Kurtosis 
greater than 3 is positive excess kurtosis. 
Distributions with kurtosis greater than 3 
is leptokurtic.) For this same question, we 
observe negative skew, i.e. for this group 
of respondents the distribution appears as 
a right-leaning curve. (We suppose that 
this can be interpreted as «respondents 
provide a socially approved response 
that is not appropriate for their behavior 
during the experiment».)
Next, we found that distribution of 
data was not normal according to Kolmo-
grov-Smirnov normality test (p < 0.05). 
Therefore, we use methods of nonpara-
metric analysis towards all 20 statements: 
Mann-Whitney U Test and Kruskal-Wallis 
H Test. 
First, we use Mann-Whitney U Test. 
Mann–Whitney U test (also called the 
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test) is a test 
of the null hypothesis that it is equally 
likely that a randomly selected value from 
group 1 will be less than or greater than 
a randomly selected value from group 2 
(Table 6). The observations from both 
groups are combined and ranked. The 
test calculates the number of times that a 
score from group 1 precedes a score from 
group 2 and the number of times that a 
score from group 2 precedes a score from 
group 1. The Mann-Whitney U statistic is 
the smaller of these two numbers. The Wil-
coxon rank sum W statistic is the smaller 
of the two rank sums. For large samples 
(one or both groups with n > 20) the value 
of U approaches a normal distribution, and 
so the null hypothesis can be tested by a 
Z-test. We compare the obtained Z value 
and the critical Z value to determine wheth-
er to retain or reject the null hypothesis:
– if the absolute value of the obtained 
Z is less than 1.96 (for 5% two tailed), then 
we should retain H0;
– if the absolute value of the obtained 
Z is greater than 1.96, then we should re-
ject H0.
Then we use Kruskal–Wallis H test 
(Table 7). It extends the Mann–Whitney 
U test, which is used for comparing only 
two groups; it can be used for compar-
ing two or more independent samples. 
If sample consist from more than five 
members per group, we should treat H as 
Chi-Square. H is statistically significant 
if it is equal to or larger than the critical 
value of Chi-Square for particular degree 
of freedom. 
We have: df = 1; p = 5%; critical Chi-
Square = 3.84.
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Table 5 
Summary of Responses
№ Statement Mean Std. Deviation Mode Kurtosis Skewness
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 The tax system in our 
country allows redistrib-
uting income effectively
2.89 3.05 0.91 0.99 3 3 –0.40 –0.42 0.09 0.19
2 Due to taxes, health care 
systems, education, etc. 
are developing
3.26 3.70 1.22 1.06 4 4 –1.30 –0.39 –0.09 –0.63
3 The tax system in our 
country is ineffective 
3.05 3.09 1.17 1.07 2 3 –1.07 –0.69 0.15 0.14
4 Most citizens in our 
country pay taxes on 
time and in full
2.86 2.80 0.94 0.93 2 3 –0.82 –0.55 0.28 0.10
5 If everyone pays taxes, 
the standard of living 
in our country will 
increase
3.36 3.77 1.15 0.87 4 4 –0.43 –0.16 –0.26 –0.34
6 In our country there will 
never be fair taxation
2.65 2.62 1.18 0.99 2 2 –0.57 –0.22 0.43 0.39
7 If to raise taxes, we all 
will live better
2.03 1.98 0.93 0.96 1 2 –0.84 2.21 0.42 1.35
8 The attitude toward 
taxes in our country can 
change for the better
3.59 3.62 0.94 1.06 4 3 0.40 –0.27 –0.67 –0.44
9 Taxes are fees for certain 
public goods provided 
by the state
3.79 4.14 1.09 0.91 4 5 0.83 –0.28 –1.11 –0.79
10 A good citizen has to 
pay taxes
4.21 4.64 0.90 0.54 4 5 3.46 0.42 –1.60 –1.18
11 One of the functions of 
taxation is social justice
3.80 4.01 1.03 0.98 5 5 –1.09 –0.49 –0.29 –0.62
12 Taxes are inevitable 3.76 4.07 1.12 0.98 4 4 –0.47 0.77 –0.64 –1.11
13 I pay taxes on all my 
income
3.65 4.08 1.03 1.16 4 5 –1.07 –0.48 –0.20 –0.92
14 If there is even the 
slightest opportunity 
to avoid paying taxes, I 
will use it
3.17 2.54 1.00 1.24 3 2 –0.21 –0.74 0.03 0.46
15 I pay taxes because I 
believe that it is my duty
3.38 3.94 1.02 1.11 4 5 –1.10 0.44 0.07 –1.01
16 I will pay taxes only in 
the case of a real threat 
of restricting travel 
abroad
2.33 1.66 1.24 0.78 2 1 –0.47 0.34 0.72 0.97
17 The tax system in our 
country is open and 
transparent
2.26 2.63 0.97 0.99 2 2 –0.83 –0.38 0.30 0.27
18 I do not trust our tax 
service
2.88 2.93 1.12 1.08 3 3 –0.52 –0.50 –0.03 0.10
19 Paying taxes, I know 
exactly what this money 
goes
2.06 2.22 1.02 0.97 2 2 –0.07 –0.58 0.77 0.38
20 Filling in the tax 
payment form not cause 
difficulty for me
3.02 3.07 0.95 1.15 3 3 –0.21 –0.62 –0.14 0.02
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Table 7 
Kruskal–Wallis H test
№ of state-
ment
Chi-
Square
Asymp. 
Sig.
Inference
1 0.960 0.327 H0
2 5.798 0.016 Reject
3 0.093 0.761 H0
4 0.076 0.783 H0
5 5.820 0.016 Reject
6 0.001 0.980 H0
7 0.332 0.565 H0
8 0.024 0.877 H0
9 4.818 0.028 Reject
10 13.081 0.000 Reject
11 1.840 0.175 H0
12 3.573 0.059 H0
13 9.145 0.002 Reject
14 13.632 0.000 Reject
15 13.961 0.000 Reject
16 13.551 0.000 Reject
17 5.615 0.018 Reject
18 0.035 0.851 H0
19 1.556 0.212 H0
20 0.052 0.820 H0
Thus, as a result of the analysis, it was 
revealed that there are differences in the 
distribution of answers to the question-
naire among tax payers and tax evaders 
on the following answers (Table 8).
Table 8 
Results from nonparametric analysis
№ of 
state-
ment
Statements
2 Due to taxes, health care systems, 
education, etc. are developing
5 If everyone pays taxes, the standard 
of living in our country will increase
9 Taxes are fees for certain public goods 
provided by the state
10 A good citizen has to pay taxes
13 I pay taxes on all my income
14 If there is even the slightest opportu-
nity to avoid paying taxes, I will use it
15 I pay taxes because I believe that it is 
my duty
16 I will pay taxes only in the case of a 
real threat of restricting travel abroad
17 The tax system in our country is open 
and transparent
Table 6 
Mann-Whitney U test
№ of 
statement
Mann-
Whitney U
Wilcoxon 
W
Z Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
Exact Sig.
(2-tailed)
Exact Sig.
(1-tailed)
Point  
Probability
Infe-
rence
1 3878.5 6089.5 –0.980 0.327 0.329 0.165 0.001 H0
2 3371.5 5582.5 –2.408 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.000 Reject
3 4115.0 6326.0 –0.305 0.761 0.762 0.381 0.001 H0
4 4127.0 12383.0 –0.275 0.783 0.783 0.392 0.002 H0
5 3370.5 5581.5 –2.413 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.000 Reject
6 4215.0 6426.0 –0.025 0.980 0.981 0.491 0.001 H0
7 4024.5 12280.5 –0.576 0.565 0.567 0.283 0.000 H0
8 4169.0 6380.0 –0.155 0.877 0.878 0.439 0.001 H0
9 3459.0 5670.0 –2.195 0.028 0.028 0.014 0.000 Reject
10 3059.0 5270.0 –3.617 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Reject
11 3745.0 5956.0 –1.357 0.175 0.174 0.088 0.001 H0
12 3563.5 5774.5 –1.890 0.059 0.059 0.030 0.000 H0
13 3162.5 5373.5 –3.024 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 Reject
14 2895.5 11151.5 –3.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Reject
15 2893.0 5104.0 –3.736 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Reject
16 2949.5 11205.5 –3.681 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Reject
17 3384.5 5595.5 –2.370 0.018 0.018 0.009 0.000 Reject
18 4157.0 6368.0 –0.188 0.851 0.851 0.425 0.001 H0
19 3782.5 5993.5 –1.247 0.212 0.214 0.107 0.001 H0
20 4143.0 6354.0 –0.228 0.820 0.810 0.405 0.000 H0
Note: Grouping Variable: compliance
Journal of Tax Reform. 2018. T. 4, № 3. С. 266–290
280
ISSN 2412-8872
The results of modal value calculation 
are presented in Figure 6.
It can be noted that:
1. «Law-abiding taxpayers» show 
greater solidarity in the affirmative an-
swers to the questions: «Taxes are fees 
for certain public goods provided by the 
state»; «A good citizen has to pay taxes»; 
«I pay taxes on all my income»; «I pay 
taxes because I believe that it is my duty».
2. The majority of «offenders» do not 
agree with the statement «If to raise taxes, 
we all will live better».
This is quite consistent with partici-
pants’ behavior during the game.
3.2. Experimental Results in Belarus 
The game results indicate that:
– when the tax rate is higher the tax 
noncompliance increases (the amount 
of unpaid tax increases in the average 
sample and the share tax evaders also in-
creased);
– when the probability of tax audit is 
lower the amount of unpaid tax and the 
rate of tax evaders also increases; 
– when the fines rate is higher the tax 
noncompliance decreases (the amount of 
unpaid tax decreases and the share tax 
evaders also decreased);
– the tax refund combined with the in-
come decrease resulting in the higher tax 
compliance only in the half of the sample 
(lower share of unpaid taxes, as well as the 
lower share of evaders).
This suggests that taxpayers in Be-
larus do not trust the allocation of budget-
ary funds and prefer to determine the use 
of their income by themselves (they give 
priority to the growth of earned income, 
rather than budget subsidies). Since the 
students were oriented toward the grade 
earned from the results of the game, they 
could calculate the amount of allocable 
funds, which is difficult to do in real eco-
nomic conditions.
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Figure 6. The results of the questionnaire on attitude towards tax system:  
modal value (Russia)
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The game results are presented in 
Figure 7.
The figure shows, that under experi-
ment conditions, the change in the share 
of unpaid tax moved closely with the 
share of evaders, except the round with 
tax refund.
Comparison the share of unpaid 
tax and the share of evaders under dif-
ferent experiment conditions presented 
on Figure 8.
Comparison of changes in indicators 
allows us to conclude that the increase 
in the tax rate and penalties causes еру 
more intensive increase in the share of 
evaders compared to the share of unpaid 
taxes. The decrease in the audit probabil-
ity causes a faster change in the share of 
unpaid taxes compared to the change in 
the share of tax evasion. The decrease in 
the amount of income and the tax refund 
leads to the decrease in the share of evad-
ers, but causes the increase in the share of 
unpaid taxes. Thus, an increase in the tax 
burden and a decrease in the probability 
of tax audit causes Belarusian taxpayers 
to seek to violate the tax legislation. The 
strengthening of measures of responsibili-
ty for violations — stimulate the reduction 
of unpaid taxes.
 
0
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40
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70
Initial
conditions
Tax rate
increases
Audit probability
decreases
Penalty
increases
Tax refund;
income decreases
Share of unpaid tax, % Share of evaders, %
Figure 7. Tax evasion rate by determinants of the experiment (Belarus)
Tax refund; income decreases
↑ 37.31% unpaid tax ↓ 46.55% evaders
Penalty increases
↓ 36.94% unpaid tax ↓ 50.27% evaders
Audit probability decreases
↑ 48.26% unpaid tax ↑ 65.27% evaders 
Tax rate increases
↑ 33.62% unpaid tax ↑ 51.53% evaders
Initial conditions
27.70% unpaid tax 37.78% evaders
Figure 8. The impact of economic incentives  
on the experiment participants’ behavior (Belarus)
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The results of the survey on attitude 
to tax system and taxation are presented 
in Figure 9.
4. Comparison of research results  
with the same from other countries
In the previous part of the paper we 
presented the tax experiment data from 
two universities of Russia and Belarus. 
The survey data from students at Baikal 
State University were supplemented with 
the data obtained from students of Far 
Eastern Federal University, Saint Peters-
burg  State University and Financial Uni-
versity under the Government of the Rus-
sian Federation (292 people in total).
We compared the data of our study 
with the results of the study on tax morale 
of Turkish and Spanish students from 
the universities of Sakarya (Turkey) and 
Zaragoza (Spain) [35]. The total number 
of students surveyed in these countries 
was 459 people. All of them studied tax 
issues and had an idea about taxes as part 
of their educational programs.
Comparison of results was possible 
for several groups of questions charac-
terizing:
– perception on fairness of the tax 
system;
– attitude towards the obligation to 
pay taxes;
– the potential of law-abiding 
behavior;
– attitude to the tax authorities.
The wording of the same questions 
in different studies had some differences, 
which in our opinion is not crucial for 
comparing the results (Figure 10).
To compare the results of surveys, 
the data were brought to a uniform form. 
Thus, i.e. if in a survey conducted in Rus-
sia and Belarus, agreement with a certain 
statement meant satisfaction with the tax 
system, and in a survey conducted in Tur-
key and Spain, it had the opposite mean-
ing, then for international comparison 
we rephrased the statement wording (by 
changing, respectively, the location of data 
obtained from answers of respondents). 
0 20 40 60 80 100
The tax system in our country allows redistributing income effectively
Due to taxes, health care systems, education, etc. are developing
The tax system in our country is ineffective
Most citizens in our country pay taxes on time and in full
If everyone pays taxes, the standard of living in our country will increase
In our country there will never be fair taxation
If to raise taxes, we all will live better
The attitude toward taxes in our country can change for the better
Taxes are fees for certain public goods provided by the state
A good citizen has to pay taxes
One of the functions of taxation is social justice
Taxes are inevitable
I pay taxes on all my income
If there is even the slightest opportunity to avoid paying taxes, I will use it
I pay taxes because I believe that it is my duty
I will pay taxes only in the case of a real threat of restricting travel abroad
The tax system in our country is open and transparent
I do not trust our tax service
Paying taxes, I know exactly what this money goes
Filling in the tax payment form not cause difficulty for me
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 9. The results of the questionnaire on attitude towards tax system 
(Belarus)
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As a result, in all statements, consent de-
notes high tax morale of the taxpayer.
The results are shown in the Figure 11.
Figure 11 makes it possible to dis-
tinguish features of tax systems of these 
countries from the point of view of the 
experiment participants, motivating them 
to make a decision on tax payment or tax 
evasion.
Even more clearly the perception of 
such features can be seen by calculating 
the ratio of the share of those who agreed 
Questions characterizes the perception on justice of the tax system
Russia, Belarus Turkey, Spain
In our country there will never be fair 
taxation I think that our tax system is fair
The tax system in our country allows 
redistributing income effectively Tax revenues are used correctly
Russia, Belarus Turkey, Spain
Most citizens in our country pay taxes on 
time and in full
There are many people who evade tax
in my immediate environment
A good citizen ha to pay taxes Tax payment is moral duty of every citizen
Questions describes the attitude towards the obligation to pay taxes
Questions explores the potential of law-abiding behavior
Russia, Belarus Turkey, Spain
I pay taxes on all my income I do not think to evade tax in the future
If there is even the slightest opportunity
to avoid paying taxes, I will use it If I get the opportunity, I may evade tax
Questions describes the attitude towards the tax authorities
Russia, Belarus Turkey, Spain
I do not trust our tax service I do not have positive ideas about employees of tax administration
Questions is aimed at exploring how legislation is understandable for citizens
Russia, Belarus Turkey, Spain
Filling in the tax payment form not cause 
difficulty for me
Tax laws are not understood easily in my 
country
≈
≈
≈
≈
≈
≈
≈
≈
Figure 10. Groups of questions characterizing attitude to tax system 
in different countries
with the statement with the share of those 
who did not agree with it. The results are 
presented in the Table 9.
Based on the results of summari-
zing the data in the last table, we can 
draw the following conclusions about 
the perception of the tax system by 
respondents:
1. Russia: legislation is non-under-
standable for citizens; but consider paying 
taxes a moral duty; assert that they will 
not avoid paying taxes in the future.
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0 20 40 60 80 100
I think that our tax system is fair
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Tax revenues are used correctly
Most citizens in our country pay taxes
on time and in full
Tax payment is moral duty of every citizen
I do not think to evade tax in the future
If there is even the slightest opportunity
to avoid paying taxes, I will not use it
I trust our tax service
Tax laws are understandable in my country
I completely disagree I do not agree I find it difficult to answer I agree I fully agree
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Spain
Figure 11. Processed surveys’ results
2. Belarus: do not consider paying 
taxes a moral duty; [if it is possible] they 
avoid paying taxes now, and will avoid 
paying in the future.
3. Turkey: legislation is non-under-
standable for citizens; they do not trust 
the tax authorities, but they will pay and 
pay taxes (it can be assumed that the exist-
ing system of punishments is perceived as 
harsh: the highest value of ratios of agreed 
and disagreed persons with recent state-
ments).
4. Spain: unfair tax system; funds are 
used incorrectly in terms of respondents; 
think that many avoid paying taxes; legis-
lation is non-understandable for citizens; 
but paying is regarded as a moral duty; 
assert that they will pay taxes.
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Table 9 
Surveys’ results — cross-country comparison
Statements Country I completely 
disagree + I 
do not agree
I find it 
difficult 
to answer
I agree 
+ I 
fully 
agree
Ratio of the share of those 
who agreed with the state-
ment with the share of those 
who did not agree with it
Perception on justice of the tax system
I think that our tax 
system is fair
Russia 21.31 33.68 45.02 2.11
Belarus 50.29 32.00 17.71 0.35
Turkey 53.13 29.17 17.71 0.33
Spain 72.00 12.00 16.00 0.22
Tax revenues are 
used correctly
Russia 26.37 35.62 38.01 1.44
Belarus 33.14 36.57 30.29 0.91
Turkey 54.69 31.51 13.80 0.25
Spain 72.00 18.67 9.33 0.13
Attitude towards the obligation to pay taxes
Most citizens in our 
country pay taxes on 
time and in full
Russia 36.30 29.11 34.59 0.95
Belarus 40.57 29.14 30.29 0.75
Turkey 36.29 22.98 40.73 1.12
Spain 31.08 54.05 14.86 0.48
Tax payment is 
moral duty of every 
citizen
Russia 2.40 5.14 92.47 38.57
Belarus 73.14 16.57 10.29 0.14
Turkey 4.95 4.69 90.36 18.26
Spain 2.70 2.70 94.59 35.00
Potential of law-abiding behavior
I do not think to 
evade tax in the 
future
Russia 14.04 18.15 67.81 4.83
Belarus 62.86 19.43 17.71 0.28
Turkey 13.02 13.54 73.44 5.64
Spain 6.67 25.33 68.00 10.20
If there is even the 
slightest opportu-
nity to avoid paying 
taxes, I will not use it
Russia 24.32 32.53 43.15 1.77
Belarus 26.86 33.71 39.43 1.47
Turkey 16.45 10.70 72.85 4.43
Spain 30.14 23.29 46.58 1.55
Attitude towards the tax authorities
I trust our tax service Russia 18.84 37.33 43.84 2.33
Belarus 49.14 34.86 16.00 0.33
Turkey 50.13 36.03 13.84 0.28
Spain 39.19 40.54 20.27 0.52
How legislation is understandable for citizens
Tax laws are un-
derstandable in my 
country
Russia 40.75 38.36 20.89 0.51
Belarus 22.86 50.29 26.86 1.18
Turkey 57.48 27.56 14.96 0.26
Spain 64.00 20.00 16.00 0.25
Journal of Tax Reform. 2018. T. 4, № 3. С. 266–290
286
ISSN 2412-8872
Discussion and conclusions
As this experiment is one of the first 
in the Russian Federation, its main result 
is testing the available instruments for 
studying tax behavior. The results of the 
experiment, first, proved that this method 
can be used in our country and second, 
highlighted the advantages of experimen-
tal methods for studying tax behavior: 
– lab experiments make it possible to 
obtain information that was not available 
earlier (for example, the influence of in-
centives modeled by the researcher on the 
behavior of subjects); 
– the experiment allows the research-
ers to control variables and test a large 
number of alternatives at low cost; 
– lab experiment can be recreated. 
 Experiment results confirmed that 
non-material incentives can be used as 
motivation. In our experiment it was 
the number of points added towards the 
credit grade of students. The credit grade 
for an academic discipline is based on a 
100-point scale, so 32–45 points that can 
be earned as a result of the game were 
a considerable incentive, besides, it im-
proved attendance and increased interest 
in studying taxes. 
Lab experiments are carried out in an 
artificial environment and the behavior of 
students (who are not yet taxpayers) may 
not correspond to the behavior of actual 
taxpayers. The problem of “external va-
lidity” of lab tax experiments (how well 
the research corresponds to the objective 
reality) is recognized and analyzed by re-
searchers. 
 The comparison of the results of ex-
periments involving students and groups 
of other test subjects in the USA [36] (ob-
tained with the help from the Internal 
Revenue Service) showed that firstly, be-
havior models of subjects in the laboratory 
correspond to the behavior model of per-
sons making similar decisions in natural 
conditions. Secondly, behavioral reactions 
of students are similar to the behavior re-
actions of real taxpayers [37]. Special re-
search has been carried out to compare 
the results of experiments with students 
and with other test subjects. Thus, Alm, 
Bloomquist & McKee [38] compared tax 
behavior of students and professors and 
university staff. This research showed that 
students were less law-abiding, but when 
the parameters of the experiment were 
changed, it matched the behavior of other 
participants who were not students. The 
study by Bloomquist [39], who compared 
tax behavior of students in the conditions 
of the lab experiment and the results of a 
selective audit of real taxpayers, also re-
vealed similar results in both groups. 
Thus it is possible to conclude that 
the results of experiments involving stu-
dents do not allow researchers to make 
definite conclusions regarding the level 
of tax avoidance, but make it possible to 
judge how different factors influence it. 
The changes in the tax behavior of stu-
dents in the experimental environment 
help understand which factors influence 
the tax-related behavior of real taxpayers 
in our country and how this behavior can 
be changes to make it more law-abiding. 
It is necessary to answer the questions 
“why people pay taxes?”, “why the level 
of tax conscientiousness is different?”, 
“how taxpayers react to different changes 
in taxation?” to formulate conditions that 
contribute to maximizing the collection of 
taxes without additional administrative 
pressure. 
We studied the influence of three fac-
tors on the behavior of taxpayers: level of 
education, economic incentives and atti-
tude to the tax system. 
The influence of the level of education on 
tax behavior 
Arguably, education has a positive 
influence on tax behavior. Better edu-
cated people find it easier to understand 
legislation and changes in it and, cor-
respondingly, less often make mistakes 
when calculating and paying taxes. In-
sufficient knowledge about taxes dete-
riorates trust in tax authorities and tax 
system and, correspondingly, impedes 
lawful tax behavior. 
Our research showed that a higher 
level of education makes a person not only 
a more literate, but also a more responsi-
ble taxpayer. It should be noted, however, 
that results of other research of this factor 
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found in foreign publications are not so 
unequivocal. One study (Bobek et al. [40]) 
proves that a low level of education could 
be the reason behind low tax discipline, 
while another study (Kirchler [41]) shows 
that the complexity of tax legislation, in-
sufficient understanding of tax responsi-
bilities and the feeling of insecurity stimu-
late tax discipline. Besides, a higher level 
of education makes it possible to work 
out and use schemes of tax minimization. 
Thus, an increase in the level of education 
leads, on the one hand, to the reduction of 
tax avoidance and, on the other, to the in-
crease of tax minimization6. 
The influence of economic incentives 
(profits and losses) on tax behavior
Our experiment studied the influence 
of the size of income, tax rate and possible 
losses in cases of avoidance (the possibil-
ity of audits and the size of fines) on the 
behavior of taxpayers. 
The results were as following: 
– an increase in income does not have 
any considerable influence of the obser-
vance of tax legislation; 
– an increase in tax rates leads to a 
growth in the number of violations; 
– the reduction of the possibility that 
the declaration will be checked has little 
influence on the improvement in the ob-
servance of tax legislation, besides, if this 
possibility is lowered, it has a weak influ-
ence on the decision to commit unlawful 
6 Tax minimization is lawful practice of tax-
payers aimed at reducing the tax burden, unlike 
unlawful tax avoidance.
acts, but the violators are ready to risk 
greater sums; 
– an increase in the size of fines re-
duces avoidance, both in terms of the con-
cealed sums and the number of violators. 
These results support the strategy that 
has been chosen by tax authorities who 
reduce the number of audits and concen-
trate their efforts on working with specific 
groups of taxpayers. A possible way to re-
duce tax avoidance could be the increase 
of fines (up from the current 20%), at least 
for some violations. 
The influence of attitude to the tax 
system on tax behavior
The obtained results agree with the 
hypothesis regarding the influence of the 
attitude to the tax system on tax behavior: 
those who pay taxes have a positive atti-
tude to the system of taxation, understand 
paying taxes as their duty, recognize the 
effectiveness of taxation and redistribu-
tion of income and believe that our tax 
system is open and transparent. And 
vice-versa, those who avoid taxes do not 
trust our tax system, do not consider it to 
be just, do not believe that it is open and 
transparent and will only pay if they are 
forced to do so. 
In our opinion, key research results 
of the conducted tax experiment are that 
education is a necessary factor in the up-
bringing of a law-abiding taxpayer and 
that trust towards the government and the 
system of taxation, the understanding of 
the society-oriented character of the state 
are the main incentives for paying taxes. 
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